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Many renewable resources are in intergenerational common pools, exploited by one generation after another. In 
our  experiment,  the  stock  available  to  each  generation  depends  on  the  extent  of  exploitation  by  previous 
generations and on resource’s growth rate, which is either “slow” or “fast.” Subjects show altruistic restraint in 
exploitation, but not enough to achieve the social optimum. The presence of an intergenerational link induces 
subjects – both in “slow” and in “fast” – to expect less resource exploitation from each other than subjects expect 
in a single generation control. On average, expectations are too optimistic, especially in “slow,” where intended 
free-riding behavior is predominant.  
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1. Introduction 
Many resources are in common pools from which the exclusion of users is not feasible or very 
costly (e.g. fisheries, forests, grazing systems, wildlife, water resources, clean air, etc.). In his 
formal analysis of the problem of common pool resources (CPR), Gordon (1954) expresses 
the contention that their exploitation inevitably leads to “the tragedy of the commons” (Hardin 
1968), when human behavior is driven by the maximization of individual payoffs and not by 
the desire to achieve a socially optimal solution. While surveys confirm a wide-spread desire 
in the population for arriving at a cooperative management of critical natural resources (e.g. 
Kuckartz and Grunenberg 2002), there is also well-established general knowledge that many 
resources are being overexploited – even to the point of no return (e.g. Noble 2002; World 
Bank 2002). Recent field studies
1 have helped to derive a number of parameters that enhance 
the likelihood of sustained self-governance (Ostrom 1999). Many of these parameters (e.g. 
communication and punishment) have been validated experimentally. A closer look at the 
literature, however, reveals that essentially all mechanisms that have been shown to mitigate 
the overexploitation problem are not easily available across distant generations of users. Since 
almost all naturally occurring CPRs are intergenerational common pools, it seems obvious 
that  intergenerational  dynamics  constitute  an  important  aspect  of  CPR  exploitation  and 
deserve more attention. The question we address in this paper is whether the intergenerational 
perspective of the CPR appropriators can contribute to the sustainability of the resource use. 
Isolating structural influences on appropriation behavior in CPR field data appears difficult, 
because it is often hard to find instances that are sufficiently comparable, but differ only with 
respect to a specific feature. To this end experimental studies on a number of CPR structures 
have proven valuable. In simple static CPRs, extraction levels quickly converge to the socially 
inefficient  equilibrium  (Walker,  Gardner,  and  Ostrom  1990;  Walker  and  Gardner  1992; 
Andreoni 1993; Ledyard 1995; Keser and Gardner 1999). Uncertainty about appropriation 
capacity  and  complexity  exacerbate  the  CPR  over-exploitation  (Budescu,  Rapoport,  and 
Suleiman  1995;  Moxnes  1998).  Similarly,  the  over-exploitation  problem  is  aggravated  in 
dynamic CPRs with an intertemporal link between extraction periods (Herr, Gardner, and 
                                                 
1  For  overviews  see  Ostrom  1990;  Ostrom,  Gardner,  and  Walker  1994;  Ostrom  1998.  A  non-exhaustive 
enumeration of CPRs that have been examined: Sweeney, Tollison, and Willett (1974) study fishes, oil, and 
manganese nodules. Morrow and Hull (1996) study forest exploitation in the Palcazu Valley of Peru. Gardner, 
Moore, and Walker (1997) study groundwater depletion. Pena Torres (1997) studies fishing in Chile. Gardner, 
Herr, Ostrom, and Walker (2000) study proportional cutbacks of chlorofluorocarbon emissions and of the fishing 
fleets in the EU. Grafton, Squires, and Fox (2000) study British Columbia halibut fishery.   2
Walker 1997; Mason and Phillips 1997). Only two-way communication, collective action, and 
indefinite  repeated  play  have  been  shown  to  mitigate  the  inefficiency  problem  (Ostrom, 
Walker, Gardner 1992 and 1994; Hackett, Schlager, and Walker 1994; Mason and Phillips 
1997; Carpenter 2000; Walker, Gardner, Herr, Ostrom 2000; Margreiter and Sutter 2001).  
All these experiments have dealt with single generation common pool resource problems. In 
reality, however, many resources are in intergenerational common pools, i.e. are exploited by 
one generation after another. Our research interest is to study extraction behavior in such 
dynamic  multi-generational  CPRs.  Note,  that  there  is  an  important  structural  difference 
between  the  dynamic  intergenerational  CPRs  and  the  dynamic  single  generation  CPRs 
studied before (Herr, Gardner, and Walker 1997; Mason and Phillips 1997). In the latter, the 
same  individuals  are  active  in  all  extraction  periods,  while  in  the  former  disjoint  sets  of 
individuals are active in each generation. This has crucial implications, because none of the 
instruments that appear to mitigate the commons problem, can be easily implemented in the 
intergenerational setting. For one thing, two-way communication is not possible across all 
generations of an intergenerational CPR. For another thing, there is no means of sanctioning 
self-serving behavior of generations that have long past. Finally, assuming indefinite play 
between appropriators from distant generations is not feasible. While, these mechanisms that 
are  effectively  used  in  single  generation  CPRs  are  not  available  in  the  intergenerational 
context, there is more room in the latter for altruism, because individuals know that their 
restraint has positive effects not only on the own generation, but also on all future generations 
to come. Our main working hypothesis, the intergenerational altruism hypothesis, is that in a 
typical CPR situation the extent of exploitation decreases as agents recognize that resource 
extraction not only creates negative externalities for the own generation, but also for all future 
generations. Hence, we expect to see lower extraction rates in an experimental CPR game 
with multiple interlinked generations, than in the standard single generation CPR settings.  
We  introduce  a  new  experimental  design  that  allows  us  to  compare  treatments  with  and 
without  an  intergenerational  link,  while  keeping  constant  the  strategy  space,  the  Nash 
equilibrium,  and  the  strategy  combinations  corresponding  to  the  intragenerational  social 
optimum. As usual, the Nash equilibrium exploitation in our CPR game is well above the 
socially optimal level. In our main treatment, the resource stock in any period is a function of 
the previous period’s stock and harvest, as well as the natural growth rate of the resource. As 
in most models of naturally occurring CPRs, the growth rate of the resource in our main 
treatment is too low as to compensate for equilibrium exploitation (Pearce and Turner 1990).   3
This  means  that  the  resource  stock  is  not  sustained,  if  every  generation  extracts  the 
equilibrium quantities. Since the resource grows slower than it is exploited in equilibrium, we 
call our main treatment the slow growth treatment. 
We compare behavior in the slow growth treatment to two controls. On the one hand, we look 
at a setting in which no intergenerational link exists. Since all parameters in every generation 
of  this  static  control  treatment  are  exactly  the  same  as  the  initial  parameters  in  the  slow 
growth treatment, we call this setup the restart treatment. On the other hand, we examine a 
setting in our second control treatment, in which the natural growth of the common pool 
resource overcompensates the total equilibrium exploitation of the appropriators. Hence, we 
call this control the fast growth treatment.  
While  the  intergenerational  altruism  hypothesis  predicts  higher  CPR  appropriation  in  the 
restart treatment than in either of the treatments with an intergenerational link, we expect the 
effect to be especially strong in the slow growth treatment, in which the resource is inevitably 
depleted  if  subjects  show  no  altruistic  restraint.  In  contrast,  the  restraining  effect  of  the 
intergenerational  link  may  not  be  very  strong  in  the  fast  growth  treatment,  since  even 
equilibrium behavior leaves more resources to the future generations than were available to 
the current generation.  
An alternative hypothesis is based on the growing literature on equity preferences. There is 
ample  experimental  evidence  that  subjects  take  costly  actions  in  order  to  enhance  the 
equitable distribution of income (Fehr and Schmidt 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels 2000). Thus, 
we conjecture that subjects may intend to equalize payoffs across generations. In the case of 
the slow growth treatment, this intergenerational equity hypothesis simply implies restraint in 
extraction,  just  as  altruistic  preferences  would.  In  the  case  of  the  fast  growth  treatment, 
however,  altruism  towards  later  generations  implies  restraint,  while  the  intergenerational 
equity  hypothesis  implies  extracting  even  more  than  in  the  Nash  equilibrium.  Thus,  the 
predictions of altruism and equity go in opposite directions. The possibility to disentangle 
altruistic and equity preferences is the reason we introduce the fast growth control.  
The strict equity principle discussed above implies that subjects are actually willing to incur a 
cost to destroy income opportunities of future generations. Although this type of destructive 
behavior  has  been  observed  in  many  other  experiments,  it  seems  quite  extreme  in  the   4
intergenerational  context.
2  A  weaker  intergenerational  equity  principle  that  is  frequently 
discussed (Solow 1974; Riley 1980; Pezzey 1992, 1997; Arrow, Cline, Mäler, Munasinghe, 
Stiglitz  1995)  is  based  on  the  notion  of  sustainable  development  maintaining  that 
consumption  opportunities  of  future  generations  should  be  at  least  at  the  same  level  as 
consumption today, but not ruling out higher future consumption levels.
3 The combination of 
our main treatment and the two controls enables us to check for the hypothesis that subjects’ 
behavior  is  guided  by  the  principle  of  sustainable  development  (sustainable  development 
hypothesis). If this is the case, we will observe extraction levels that are lower in the slow 
growth than in either of the two control treatments. But, we should not detect a difference in 
the  extraction  levels  when  comparing  the  fast  growth  to  the  restart  treatment,  because 
choosing lower extraction levels in the fast growth treatment helps future generations that are 
better off anyway. 
In addition to the extraction decisions, we elicit the expectations of subjects concerning the 
behavior of their peers. The data allows us to assess the extent to which subjects choose 
payoff maximizing best replies to own expectations and the extent to which they deliberately 
sacrifice own payoff by extracting less than the subjectively optimal amount. Since we have 
no reason to believe that the expectations will not be aligned with the actual behavior, our 
altruism hypothesis implies that intentional sacrifices will be observed to a greater extent in 
the treatments with an intergenerational link – especially in the slow growth treatment – than 
in the restart treatment. The (strict) equity hypothesis implies that subjects in the fast growth 
treatment should expect intentional and costly resource destruction, while the sustainability 
hypothesis implies that no sacrifices are predicted in the fast and restart controls. 
                                                 
2 In ultimatum game experiments, for example, in which the proposer offers a fraction of a fixed sum of money 
to  the  receiver,  subjects  in  the  receiver  position  often  destroy  the  entire cake by rejecting the offer if it is 
perceived as unfair (Güth, Schmittberger, Schwarze 1982; Camerer and Thaler 1995). Similar behavior has also 
been observed in other games (Fehr and Gächter 2000; Abbink, Irlenbusch, and Renner 2000; Bosman and van 
Winden 2002; Falk, Fehr, and Fischbacher forthcoming). Note that this type of  purely destructive behavior is 
different from the strategic destruction behavior that is meant to increase the own income opportunities. Mason 
and Polasky (1994), for example, present a model in which an incumbent extractor may choose to destroy part of 
a common pool resource in order to deter entry of new extractors. 
3 The Brundtland Report, “Our Common Future”, (United Nation’s World Commision on Environmental and 
Development 1987) defines “sustainable development” as “development that meets the needs of the present 
without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” Following up on this, the 
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992) states the goal: 
“Principle  3  -  The  right  to  development  must  be  fulfilled  so  as  to  equitably  meet  developmental  and 
environmental needs of present and future generations.” Clearly, the model we implement in our experiment 
abstracts from many of the measurement and comparison difficulties that arise in real world settings. It is this 
simplification, however, that enables us to draw unambiguous conclusions from the observed behavior.   5
We find that in all treatments actual extraction is below the Nash equilibrium level, but well 
above the symmetric social optimum. This reluctance to fully exploit the resource has also 
been observed in earlier experiments with single generation CPRs.
4 We observe significantly 
lower  exploitation  levels  in  the  fast  growth  treatment  than  in  the  restart  treatment.  This 
observation contradicts both the intergenerational equity and the sustainability hypotheses. It 
is,  however,  in  line  with  our  intergenerational  altruism  hypothesis.  But,  intergenerational 
altruism also does not seem to be fully supported by our data either, because the observed 
extraction levels in the slow growth treatment are not significantly smaller than those in the 
restart treatment. This is an especially surprising result, since all three hypotheses predict 
lower extraction levels in the slow growth treatment than in restart.  
The analysis of the subjects’ predictions of others’ behavior sheds some light on this puzzling 
result. In the two treatments with an intergenerational link, subjects expect significantly less 
extraction by their peers than in the restart treatment. Hence, in subjects’ expectations the 
intergenerational altruism hypothesis holds, i.e. just as we had, our subjects also expected to 
see  greater  restraint  in  extraction  behavior  in  the  presence  than  in  the  absence  of  an 
intergenerational  link.  While  the  majority  of  subjects  in  the  fast  growth  and  the  restart 
treatments actually live up to what they expect from others, the majority of subjects in the 
slow growth treatment appropriate more of the resource than they expect others to do.
5 Since 
the intergenerational growth rate is the only difference between treatments, we must conclude 
that the awareness of the difficulty to sustain a resource over generations destroys the positive 
effect of the intergenerational link on expectations by increasing the free-riding intentions. 
Hence,  our  initial  hope  that  an  intergenerational  link  may  mitigate  the  overexploitation 
problem of a common pool resource was in vain. 
The  discrepancy  we  find  between  subject’s  expectations  and  their  appropriation  behavior 
suggests that people’s expressed understanding for the need of restraint in intergenerational 
resource use does not necessarily imply that they will take the corresponding actions. Thus, it 
                                                 
4 In some of the reported single generation cases, observed extraction converges to the level predicted by the 
Nash equilibrium with repetition of the game. However, the mean extraction always tends to be somewhat below 
rather than above Nash levels (e.g. Walker, Gardner, and Ostrom 1990, Keser and Gardner 1999). 
5  We  thank  an anonymous referee for pointing out that the individual CPR appropriations in our game are 
strategic substitutes, which means that expecting low extraction from others results in incentives to increase own 
extraction. Note that while observed behavior in our main treatment is in line with this prediction, it is not in line 
with the observed behavior in the fast growth control, in which lower expected appropriation by others does not 
result in choosing higher own levels of resource extraction.   6
seems that the sustainable use of common pool resources should not be expected on a purely 
voluntary basis, even if surveys indicate a broad awareness and approval of the principle of 
sustainable development in the population.
6 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we briefly discuss some of the 
related literature. In sections 3 and 4 we present the game and the theoretical predictions. In 
sections 5 and 6 we report on the experimental setup and procedure. Our results are presented 
in sections 7, 8, and 9. Section 10 summarizes and concludes. 
2. Related Literature 
The  experiments  that  come  closest  to  our  design  are  by  Chermak  and  Krause  (2002), by 
Sadrieh (2003), by Herr, Gardner, and Walker (1997), and by Mason and Phillips (1997). 
Chermak and Krause (2002) report an overlapping generations CPR experiment, in which 
each of the three players enters the game with a one period delay and lives for three periods. 
In the informed treatment, players know their positions, while in the uninformed treatment 
they do not. The focus of the paper is on detecting correlations between personal traits of the 
subjects (gender, religion, political standing, etc) and their resource exploitation behavior. 
One interesting aspect of the results is that the information treatment plays a significant role 
for many of the detected effects. For example, subjects with no religious affiliation show 
significantly more restraint when they are informed than when they are not. It seems that the 
information is important, because it reveals the instance of the decision within a player’s 
“lifetime,” as well as the position of the player in the finite game. Both of these variables play 
no role in our experiment. First, our players “live” only a single period and, thus, have no 
dynamic  programming  problem.  Second,  our  design  masks  both  the  length  of  the 
intergenerational chain and the position of a player therein. Finally, every period in our game 
consists of the same intragenerational CPR game with three players, while the periods in the 
Chermak and Krause (2002) design consist of different “stage” games with different numbers 
of  active  players.  Especially,  about  half  of  the  periods  are  one-player  games  and  not 
intragenerational CPR games. 
                                                 
6 In a recent representative survey commissioned by the German ministry of environmental affairs, 78 percent of 
the interviewed individuals expressed their approval to the statement “We should not use more of the resources 
than regenerate.” (Kuckartz and Grunenberg 2002)   7
Sadrieh  (2003)  examines  the  case  of  an  intergenerational  CPR  game  in  which  every 
generation is represented by a single player. No intragenerational conflict exists, because each 
period is a one-shot, one-player game in which the player makes a single extraction decision. 
As  in  our  experiment,  the  growth  rate  of  the  CPR  is  varied  across  treatments.  The main 
interest of that study is to uncover the structure of intergenerational altruism that motivates 
restraint in extraction behavior. It turns out that a simple form of “warm glow” altruism, as 
suggested  by  Andreoni  (1990,  1995),  organizes  the  data  well,  while  the  benchmark  of 
intergenerational  equal  opportunities  plays  no  role.  Our  results  are  consistent  with  these 
findings. Specifically, our experiment confirms that subjects behavior is not at all guided by 
the desire to create strictly equal opportunities for all generations. 
The game experimented by Herr, Gardner, and Walker (1997) is not an intergenerational CPR 
game, but a dynamic CPR game in which the players exploitation behavior in early periods 
influences their own cost of exploitation in later periods. Their main result is that the myopic 
behavior of subjects in the dynamic setting exacerbates the tragedy of the commons problem. 
Mason and Phillips (1997) investigate the effects of limiting the number of firms that exploit 
a  static  or  a  dynamic  single  generation  CPR.  Their  experimental  design  that  implements 
indefinitely repeated play in a Cournot market is conducive to cooperation. They analyze the 
trade-off between the welfare loss from the increased exploitation of the CPR and the welfare 
gain  from  the  increased  competition  if  the  number  of  active  firms  in  the  market  were 
increased. They find that in their static CPR setting cooperation levels are higher than in their 
dynamic setting, especially in markets with few firms. Hence, they conclude that increasing 
the number of firms in the static CPR setting is more likely to be beneficial for welfare than in 
the dynamic setting, in which the CPR is exploited more aggressively. Thus, there is more 
evidence for the tendency of resource dynamics to aggravate the over-exploitation problem. 
The shared element of both studies with our experiment lies in the dynamics of resource 
growth, but their strategic situation is different from ours since our players can exploit the 
resource only at a single point of time.  
3. The Basic Common Pool Resource Model 
In  the  basic  model,  a  common  resource  is  exploited  by  three  symmetric  players,  each 
endowed with e units of effort. Each player i chooses the effort xi to be exerted in exploiting   8
the common resource with 0 £ xi £ e.
7 The total exploitation effort x (i.e. the sum of all three 
players’ exploitation efforts) determines the production of the common resource. 
Following the literature on common resources (Dasgupta and Heal 1974; Ostrom, Gardner, 
and Walker 1994), we assume that the production function F(x) is “hump” shaped, i.e. it is 
concave  with  its  maximum  within  the  range  of  players’  endowments.  Hence,  F(0) = 0, 
dF(x*)/dx = 0 with 0 < x* < ne, and d
2F(x)/d
2x < 0. To simplify the computations, we mimic 
the “hump” shape using a two-piece linear function, with a positive slope in the first and a 
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Since the marginal rate of return is greater than zero for x < 9, but smaller than zero for x > 9, 
it is obvious that the social optimum is exactly at x = 9 (remember that we assume that the 
marginal rate of return from the best alternative activity is zero). Thus, the social optimum 
with symmetric exploitation effort choices is reached when each player i chooses xi = x
SO = 3.  
A single player’s return on the exploitation of the common resource depends both on the own 
choice and the choices made by others. More specifically, the fraction of the total return of the 
common resource that player i receives is defined by the ratio of the own exploitation effort xi 
to the total exploitation effort x. Equation (2) specifies the return of player i.  
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Note  that  the  marginal  return  of  a  single  player  from  exploiting  the  common  resource  is 
constant and positive as long as total exploitation is below social optimum, i.e. x < 9. In this 
range, players’ exploitation actions do not cause negative externalities for the others. When 
total exploitation surpasses the social optimum, i.e. x > 9,  the marginal return of exploitation 
to a player is no longer constant, due to the negative externality caused by the other players’ 
                                                 
7 The remaining effort, e – xi, is exerted in some other “safe” activity with a return normalized to zero.   9
exploitation actions. It is easily verified that in symmetric Nash equilibrium each player i 
chooses an exploitation effort xi = x
Nash = 6 which is well above the socially optimal level.
8 
4. The Intergenerational Common Pool Resource Model 
When a resource is exploited by one generation after another, the payoff of the exploitation 
effort depends on the extent of exploitation by previous generations and the natural rate of 
resource growth. Thus, in an intergenerational framework, the availability of the resource at 
the time of exploitation must be modeled explicitly. To do so, the basic model described in 
the previous section is modified in a very simple way: We introduce a new variable R
t (“the 
reserves of the generation t”) that is a measure for the amount of resources that are available 
to the generation t. The payoff of player i in the generation t is defined as  
i = riR
t             (3) 
The basic model’s return ri is now interpreted as the fraction of the resources that player i 
receives. Thus, in terms of relative payoffs (relative to the exogenously determined reserves 
R
t), every generation plays exactly the same basic game. The only parameter that may change 
from generation to generation is the amount of resources available to the generation. This then 
determines the absolute level of payoffs.  
Since marginal returns are not affected by any change in the amount of available resources, 
equilibrium  behavior  always  remains  unchanged  across  generations.  However,  absolute 
income  opportunities  can  dramatically  vary,  depending  on  the  extent  of  preceding 
generations’ exploitation and on the rate of natural growth. If the players in a generation aim 
at providing the next generation with exactly the same income opportunities as they have 
themselves, it is necessary that they make exploitation effort choices that just compensate the 
natural  growth  of  the  resource.  Such  growth  compensating  behavior  is  focal, because the 
provision of equal opportunities is often viewed as a basic fairness norm.  
                                                 
8 Maximizing the first part of the payoff function leads to (symmetric) choices of xi = x
SO = 3. This, however, is 
not an equilibrium, because every player has an incentive to increase the own exploitation effort, given the others 
stay at x
SO. Hence, the equilibrium must be in the upper range of the return function. In that range, the derivative 
of  the  return  function  is  3 . 0 1 . 8


















j i x x x 27   is 
satisfied for all i = 1, 2, 3 at the symmetric Nash equilibrium xi = x
Nash = 6. Note that the second order condition 
is always satisfied as long as all players choose strictly positive effort levels.   10
Clearly, the relationship between equilibrium behavior and growth compensating behavior 
depends  on  the  natural  growth  rate  of  the  resource.  If  the  resource  grows  slower  than 
necessary  to  compensate  the  equilibrium  exploitation,  growth  compensation  requires  that 
players choose exploitation efforts below the equilibrium level. But, if the resource grows 
faster than the equilibrium exploitation can offset, growth compensation requires that players 
choose exploitation efforts above equilibrium level. Thus, if behavior is affected by a growth 
compensation norm, then a variation of growth rates should lead to systematic differences in 
exploitation effort choices.  
5. Experimental Setup 
In our experimental conditions we vary the growth rate of the resource, while keeping all 
other  parameters  equal.  In  the  fast  growth  treatment  (FAST)  the  common  resource has  a 
natural growth rate of 1.875. Taking the exploitation effort into account, the reserves R
t in 
FAST develop according to equation (4). As is easily verified, growth compensation requires 
that total exploitation effort is x = 21. This can, for example, be attained with symmetric effort 
choices of xi
GC = 7. 
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1           (4) 
In the slow growth treatment (SLOW) the common resource has a natural growth rate of 1.25. 
Taking the exploitation effort into account, the reserves R
t in SLOW develop according to 
equation (5). Growth compensation in SLOW is achieved with a total exploitation effort of 
x = 6, which implies xi
GC = 2 for the symmetric case. 
( )










1           (5) 
Finally, we conduct a control treatment (RESTART) with no intergenerational links, which  
means that every generation starts with exactly the same resource endowment as presented in 
equation  (6).  Thus,  in  RESTART  equal  income  opportunities  are  present  per  se,  leaving 
behavior completely unaffected by growth compensation issues. 
  
t t R R =
+1             (6)   11
Table  1  summarizes  our  experimental  setup.  Our  treatments  are  identical  concerning  the 
social  optimum  and  the  Nash  equilibrium  benchmarks.  They  differ  only  in  the  growth 
compensation benchmark. Note that growth compensation in FAST implies exerting greater 




FAST. On the other hand, growth compensation in SLOW implies exerting less exploitation 
effort than in Nash equilibrium and in social optimum, i.e. x
GC < x
SO < x
Nash  in SLOW. 
Table  1  also  indicates  that  each  treatment  was  experimented  with  4  independent 
intergenerational chains each consisting of 4 generations. In each generation there are three 
subjects playing the basic common pool resource game. The game is a proper one-shot non-
cooperative game, because subjects interact anonymously and each subject is part of only one 
generation and makes exactly one exploitation effort choice.  
Table 1 – Experimental Setup 
  symmetric choice at         
Treatment  social optimum xi
SO  Nash equilibrium xi
Nash  growth compensation xi
GC  chains  generations 
per chain 
FAST  3  6  7  4  4 
SLOW  3  6  2  4  4 
RESTART  3  6  –  4  4 
 
The reserves of the first generation in an intergenerational chain were set to R
1 = 183 in 
experimental currency units for all chains and for all treatments. For all other generations, the 
reserves are calculated according to the equations (4) – (6), depending on the treatment. This 
means that R
t = 183 for all four generations of each of the four intergenerational chains of the 
RESTART  treatment.  In  the  other  two  treatments,  the  reserves  available  to  a  non-initial 
generation are determined by the exploitation effort choices of the preceding generations in 
the intergenerational chain. 
It is important to note that every generation plays a one-shot game, not knowing of the own 
position  within  the  intergenerational  chain  and  having  no  information  on  the  exploitation 
effort choices made by the subjects in the preceding generations. Furthermore, the subjects 
could not infer their generation’s position from the size of their reserves, because of three 
reasons. First, we deliberately chose the initial generation’s reserve to be unrecognizable as a 
“starting number,” i.e. instead of choosing a multiple of 50, such as 100, 150 or 200, we chose   12
the number 183.
9 Second, no information whatsoever was given on the size of the reserves of 
the initial generation. Third, the only information that subjects were given concerning the 
length of the intergenerational chains was that these are finite.
10  
Since from a subject’s point of view, any generation could have been the initial, the final, or 
an intermediate generation, the absolute value of the reserves is the only variable that might 
have a differentiating effect on the generations’ behavior within a treatment. As reported in 
the results section below, we do not find any correlation between the value of the reserves and 
the decisions made by the subjects. Hence, we can treat each generation in our experiment as 
an independent observation of the one-shot basic game. 
6. Experimental Procedure 
The experiment was conducted at three different locations around the law school and the 
cafeteria of the University of Bonn. The locations were well apart as to avoid contact between 
subjects  at  the  three  different  points.  Students  walking  in  and  out  of  the  buildings  were 
encouraged  to  participate.  Participation  was  restricted  to  one  instance  only.  About  160 
subjects took part in the experiment. 
The  subjects  were  informed  that  the  number  of  generations  is  fixed  and  limited.  They, 
however, neither knew the actual number of generations in an intergenerational chain, nor 
which position their generation had in the chain. Towards the end of the experiment subjects 
could have noticed that the number of new subjects being recruited has dropped. To avoid 
difficulties with uncontrolled effects concerning the last generations of subjects, the data from 
the last groups has been omitted from the analysis. This leaves us with 144 subjects in four 
chains of four generations for each of the three treatments.  
Each subject was seated in a separate “cubical” that we had set up by placing wooden dividers 
on desks. The subjects were told to study the instruction sheet and the decision sheet (see the 
appendix) carefully, before making their decisions. Any questions concerning the rules of the 
                                                 
9 Note that the value of the reserves was rounded to the next integer for all generations. 
10 To avoid any contamination of the data, we do not use the data from the very last chains of our experimental 
session. The subjects in these last 10 to 15 minutes of the experiment may have believed that they are in one of 
the last generations, if they had noticed that only few new recruits are coming in.    13
game  and  the  experimental  procedures  were  answered  by  the  experimenters.  Subjects  on 
average spent about 15 minutes for the entire procedure. The experiment took 4 hours. 
The instructions made clear that none of the other recruits currently at the location would be 
in the same game as the subject making a decision. This was realized by having each of the 
three members of a generation at a different location. Additionally, multiple intergenerational 
chains were intertwined so that subsequent decision makers at each location always belonged 
to different chains.  
Exploitation effort choices were restricted to the integers {1, ..., 8} in all treatments. The 
decision sheets (see appendix) present tables with 8 rows (own effort choices) and 15 columns 
(the sum of the effort choices of the other two players). Each cell in a table contains two 
entries. The top entry in a cell represents the return r of the exploitation effort indicated on the 
left of the corresponding row, given the sum of the other players’ choices is equal to the 
number shown on top of the corresponding column. The displayed returns are percentages of 
the current generation’s reserves R
t that was recorded in a box on the top right corner of the 
decision sheet before the subject received the sheet.  
The bottom entry in each cell of the table on the decision sheet represented the effect of the 
exploitation  effort  choices  of  the  own  generation  on  the  reserves  R
t+1  of  the  following 
generation. The numbers indicate the percentage by which the current generation’s reserves R
t 
are increased or decreased in order to obtain the following generation’s reserves R
t+1. Since 
our treatments only differed in the effect of choices on future generations, the decision sheets 
given to subjects only differed in the bottom entries. 
In addition to the exploitation effort choice that had to be indicated on the decision sheet, each 
subject was also asked to guess the sum of exploitation efforts of the other players in the own 
generation. To ensure the validity of these guesses the subjects received an additional small 
payment that decreased linearly with the distance of the guess from the actual choices. For a 
perfect guess a subject received 20 Taler (the experimental currency unit), from which one 
Taler  was  deducted  for  each  effort  unit  deviation.  After  completing  the  experiment,  each 
subject’s earnings were converted at the rate of DM 0.05 per Taler. Average earnings were 
about DM 12.62 including the payment for the prediction. At the time of the experiment, one 
DM was roughly equal to ¼RUWR   14
7. Results: Choices 
Figure  1  shows  the  frequency  distributions  of  exploitation  effort  choices  in  our  three 
treatments. The mass of all distributions lies between the Nash equilibrium effort xi
Nash = 6 
and the symmetric social optimum xi
SO = 3.  
Figure 1 – Frequency distribution of exploitation effort choices 
Table 2 contains the means and the standard deviations of the exploitation effort choices. 
With the mean of 4.38 and the mode at 4, exploitation effort choices in FAST are significantly 
smaller than in SLOW and in RESTART (Mann-Whitney U-Test at the .01 level two-tailed). 
Although the modes of exploitation effort distributions in the SLOW treatment and in the 
RESTART treatment are different (6 in SLOW vs. 5 in RESTART), no significant difference 
can be detected between exploitation efforts in the two treatments.  
The means of the observed exploitation effort choices in all three treatments are significantly 
smaller than predicted by the Nash equilibrium xi
Nash = 6 (Binomial Test at the .01 level two-
tailed). While being smaller than in equilibrium, observed exploitation is significantly greater 
than expected in the symmetric social optimum xi
SO = 3 in all three treatments (Binomial Test 
at the .01 level two-tailed). These results are summarized in table 3. 
In the case of  the two treatments with an intergenerational link, we can compare observed 


























































































Nash equilibrium effort level
SO symmetric social optimum
GC growth compensating effort  15
observed exploitation effort choices are significantly smaller than the growth compensation 
effort xi
GC = 7 in the FAST treatment, while they are significantly greater than the growth 
compensation effort xi
GC = 2 in the SLOW treatment. 
Table 2 – Observed Exploitation Effort Choices 
  FAST  SLOW  RESTART 
mean  4.38  5.42  5.27 
SD  1.52  1.47  1.09 
Exploitation effort choices in FAST are significantly smaller than in SLOW and in RESTART (Mann-Whitney U-Test, 
.01 level two-tailed). There is no significant difference (not even on the .20 level two-tailed) between the latter two. 
 
Summarizing, we find that observed exploitation effort levels are significantly below the Nash 
equilibrium  level  and  above  the  symmetric  social  optimum  in  all  treatments.  While  this 
indicates that subjects in all treatments were willing to restrict personal exploitation in favor 
of mutual cooperation, they did not manage to fully arrive at the symmetric social optimum. 
Furthermore,  we  find  no  evidence  whatsoever  for  growth  compensating  behavior,  which 
would imply that subjects restrict their exploitation efforts in the SLOW, but expand them in 
the FAST treatment. Instead, subjects in FAST actually restrict their efforts significantly more 
than the subjects in SLOW. Since the growth rate is the only difference between the two 
intergenerational treatments, we must conclude that the awareness of the difficulty to sustain a 
resource over generations – such as in SLOW – generates less restraint than the knowledge 
that the resource is easily increased over generations – as in FAST. It is conceivable, for 
example,  that  subjects’  perception  of  the  payoff  information  table  (see  appendix)  was 
influenced by the fact that in FAST the table only contains positive entries for the generation 
to generation resource development, while the corresponding table in SLOW mainly contains 
negative entries. Such perception biases (“framing effects”) have been reported occasionally 
in experiments with other decision tasks (Tversky and Kahneman 1981). Finally, it should be 
noted that the difference in restraint cannot be due to a simple wealth effect, because we find 
no significant correlation between the size of the endowment and the extent of restraint.   16
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8. Results: Predictions and Intentions 
The  subjects  in  our  experiment  received  incentive  compatible  payments  for  accurately 
predicting  the  sum  of  the  exploitation  efforts  of  the  other  two  participants  in  their  own 
generation. Figure 2 shows the frequency distribution of subjects’ predictions in each of the 
three treatments. A clear difference between the distribution of the predictions made in each 
treatment is evident. While subjects in FAST expect their peers to be very cooperative (almost 
one  third  of  the  subjects  actually  expect  to  see  others  choosing  the  symmetric  social 
optimum), the subjects in SLOW have very dispersed beliefs that tend to be closer to the 
equilibrium levels than in FAST. The beliefs of subjects in RESTART are less dispersed, but 
seem to be even closer to equilibrium than in SLOW.  
The mean and the standard deviation of subjects’ predictions, shown in table 4, support this 
impression.  Predictions  both  in  FAST  and  SLOW  are  significantly  smaller  than  subjects’ 
predictions in RESTART (Mann-Whitney U-Test – at .02 and .10, two-tailed). It seems that 
the mere presence of an intergenerational context – as in the case of the FAST and the SLOW 
treatments – evokes subjects’ expectations of observing others’ altruistic behavior (i.e. smaller 
exploitation  effort  choices).  Note,  however,  that  the  intergenerational  aspect  adds  to  the 
expectation of cooperative behavior that is already present in absence of a intergenerational 
link.  In  all  three  treatments,  i.e.  including  RESTART,  the  predicted  sum  of  others’ 
exploitation effort choices is significantly smaller than in Nash equilibrium (Binomial Test – 
at .01 two-tailed – when comparing predictions to the value 12, which is the sum of others’ 
effort choices in Nash equilibrium).   17
Figure 2 – Frequency distribution of subjects’ predictions 
One might conjecture that subjects’ exploitation effort choices are simply best replies to the 
own miscalibrated predictions of others’ behavior. If this is the case, then we can assert that 
subjects actually intend to maximize their own monetary payoffs, but fail to do so, due to 
wrong expectations concerning the choices made by the other players. Figure 3 displays the 
distribution of subjects classified according to their effort choice being a best reply to their 
own  prediction  of  others’  behavior  (“intended  best  reply”),  or  being  too  low  (“intended 
sacrifice”), or too high (“intended waste”).   
It is obvious that most subjects do not intend to play monetary payoff maximizing best reply 
strategies. The majority of subjects in all three treatments choose an exploitation effort level 
that is too low compared to the best reply to their own prediction. The figures in table 4 show 
that the discrepancy between the best reply to the prediction and the actual effort choice is 
significantly negative in all treatments. This means that subjects in all three treatments intend 
to  sacrifice  some  of  their  payoff  for  the  well-being  of  others.  The  intended  sacrifice  is 
significantly greater in FAST than in either of the two other treatments (Mann-Whitney U-
Test at a = .01 two-tailed) both in relative terms (i.e. in percent of the available funds) and in 
absolute terms (i.e. sacrifice in ¼2QDYHUDJHVXEMHFWVLQ)$67LQWHQGWRVDFULILFHDERXW¼
while subjects in SLOW and RESTART intend to sacrifice only about ¼1RVLJQLILFDQW
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the two other players’
exploitation effort choices
Nash equilibrium effort level
SO symmetric social optimum
GC growth compensating effort  18
observed sacrifices cannot be fully attributed to confusion, because the subjects could simply 
look up the best response to any given prediction in the provided payoff table. Given this 
transparency  of  the  decision  situation,  we  believe  that  our  subjects  made  deliberate  and 
informed choices. 
Figure 3 – Best reply to own prediction compared to own exploitation effort choice  
Figure  3  suggests  that  there  might  also  be  some  treatment  differences  concerning  the 
frequency  the  best  reply  behavior.  It  seems  that  best  reply  choices  are  most  frequently 
observed in the SLOW treatment, while smaller than best reply choices are most frequent in 
the FAST treatment. These treatment differences, however, are not significant. 
Most subjects expect the others’ in their generation to behave cooperatively and intend to be 
cooperative themselves. But, is there a consensus
11 between the extent of the own cooperation 
and the cooperation expected from the others? Table 4 shows that the difference of the own 
exploitation effort choice minus the effort choice expected of the others is almost zero in the 
FAST and the RESTART treatment, but not so in the SLOW treatment. Only in the SLOW 
treatment  the  own  exploitation  effort  choices  are  significantly  different  (greater)  than  the 












































































sacrifice best reply waste
intended behavior
RESTART
Best Reply to Prediction
compared to
Exploitation Effort
intended sacrifice : effort < BR(prediction)
intended best reply : effort = BR(prediction)
intended waste : effort > BR(prediction)  19
Table 4 – Predictions of the sum of others’ exploitation effort choices  
  FAST  SLOW  RESTART 
own effort minus best reply to the own prediction  – 2.33 *** 
(1.69) 
– 1.02 *** 
(1.79) 
– 1.06 *** 
(1.46) 






Each cell contains the variable’s mean and (standard deviation). 
Significantly different from zero (Binomial Test) at a =  * .10 two-tailed, *** .02 two-tailed 
 
Note that the comparison between the own choice of exploitation effort and that expected of 
others  reveals  the  intention  of  the  behavior  to  some  extent.  If  a  subject  chooses  a lower 
exploitation effort than he or she expects from others, then this subject is intentionally being 
more altruistic than he or she predicts the others to be. We refer to this type of behavior as 
“intentional gift-giving.” In contrast, if a subject chooses a higher exploitation effort than he 
or she expects from others, then this subject reveals the intention to take an advantage over 
the peers. We refer to this behavior as “intentional free-riding.” Finally, subjects choosing 
exactly  the  same  exploitation  effort  as  they  expect  from others obviously intend to be in 
“consensus” with the others.  
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the three possible types of intended behavior in each of our 
treatments. Looking at the figure is seems that the intended behavior distributions are rather 
similar in FAST and RESTART, but quite different in SLOW, where almost two-thirds of the 
subjects exhibit intended free-riding behavior. Statistical tests show that this impression is 
correct: There is significantly more intended free-riding in SLOW than in either of the two 
other treatments (Fisher’s Exact Test both at the .05 level, one-tailed).  
This  analysis  reveals  an  important  difference  between  the  treatments:  When  there  is  an 
intergenerational link, but subjects know that sustaining intergenerational equity requires a 
large amount of restraint (i.e. large sacrifices compared to the selfish equilibrium), the number 
of subjects who intentionally free-ride on their peers increases dramatically. It seems that 
subjects in such cases – such as in our SLOW treatment – greedily grab large chunks of the 
pie  for  themselves,  hoping  that  their  peers  will  behave  strongly  altruistic  in  light  of  the 
environmental  difficulties.  Since  most  subjects  share  this  free-riding  attitude,  total 
                                                                                                                                                         
11 Expecting others to do as you do, even though they actually do not, is a well-known bias in judgement, often 
referred to as the false consensus effect (Ross, Greene, and House 1977).    20
exploitation  efforts  actually  turn  out  rather  high,  so  that  a  mismatch  emerges  between 
expectations and actions.  
Figure 4 – Prediction to exploitation effort choices 
Table 5 reveals that the expectations that subjects have about each others’ cooperation are too 
“optimistic,” i.e. the prediction of the exploitation efforts chosen by the others is smaller than 
the  actually  chosen.  The  deviations  of  the  predictions  from  the  sum  of  the  actual efforts 
chosen by the others are significantly smaller than zero in all three treatments. 
Table 5 – Predictions of the sum of others’ exploitation effort choices 
  FAST  SLOW  RESTART 






prediction minus actual sum of others’ efforts  – .77 ** 
(3.45) 
– 2.33 *** 
(3.62) 
– .71 *** 
(3.14) 
Each cell contains the variable’s mean and (standard deviation). 
Predicted sum of others’ effort choices both in FAST and in SLOW are significantly smaller than in RESTART (Mann-
Whitney U-Test, .02 and .10 level, resp., two-tailed). The difference between the predictions in FAST and in SLOW is 
not significant (probably due to the high dispersion in SLOW). 
Significantly different from zero (Binomial Test) at a = ** .05 two-tailed, *** .02 two-tailed 
Prediction deviations in SLOW are significantly greater than in FAST and in RESTART. (Mann-Whitney U-Test, .05, 


















































































intended gift-giving : effort < prediction/2
intended consensus : effort = prediction/2
intended free-riding : effort > prediction/2  21
Figure 5 confirms that the majority of subjects in all three treatments are too optimistic. It also 
reveals that the distributions of optimistic and pessimistic subjects across treatments are quite 
similar. However, although the counts are similar, the extent is not. The extent of subjects’ 
optimism  is  most  exaggerate  in  the  SLOW  treatment,  in  which  the  average  deviation  of 
predictions from actual choices of others (shown in table 5) is about three times greater than 
in  the  FAST  and  in  the  RESTART  treatments.  This  treatment  difference  proves  to  be 
statistically significant for both at the .05 level, two-tailed, using a Mann-Whitney U-Test. 
Figure 5 – Deviation of subjects’ predictions from the actual behavior of the others 
In  the  two  treatments  with  an  intergenerational  link,  subjects  expect  significantly  less 
extraction by their peers than in the restart treatment. But, since expectations fall well below 
actual  behavior  in  most  cases,  the  majority  of  subjects  are  too  optimistic  in  all  three 
treatments. However, the extent of optimism in the slow growth treatment is about 3 times as 
high as in the two control treatments. This is due to two different effects. Compared to the fast 
growth  control,  the  expectations  in  the  slow  growth  treatment  are  similar,  but  the  actual 
extraction levels are much greater. Compared to the restart control, the actual extraction levels 
in the slow growth treatment are similar, but the expectations on extraction by peers is much 
















































































optimistic : prediction > others’ efforts
realistic : prediction = others’ efforts
pessimistic : prediction < others’ efforts  22
subjects expect others to exercise more restraint in resource extraction than the others actually 
do (optimism) and than they themselves are willing to do (free-riding).  
The  result  described  above  indicates  that  certain  types  of  subjects  may  be  predominantly 
driving  the  observed  effects.  Figure  6  shows  the  distribution  of  subject  types  across 
treatments. The nine possible types of subjects result from the interaction of the prediction 
types and intended behavior types. An OG subject, for example, has made a too optimistic 
prediction  of  the  behavior  of  the  others  and  has  revealed  the  intention  to  be  even  more 
cooperative than he or she expects the others to be. The distributions displayed in figure 6 
support the results so far. There is hardly a difference between the distributions of subject 
types in FAST and in RESTART. In these two treatments the distributions are relatively flat, 
with the most frequent type (OF = optimistic and intended free-riding) at about one-third of 
all subjects and the second most frequent type (OC = optimistic and intended consensus) at 
about one fourth of all subjects. In contrast, the distribution of subject types in SLOW is much 
more extreme, with almost half of the subjects being OF (optimistic and intended free-riding) 
and the next most frequent category being PF (pessimistic and intended free-riding) with only 
about one-eighth of all subjects. 
Again, figure 6 underlines that the optimistic free-riding subject type (OF), that intends to 
free-ride  on  his  or  her  peers,  while  optimistically  over-estimating  their  willingness to  act 
cooperative, dominates the SLOW treatment. We had expected that the intergenerational link 
will reduce exploitation efforts. This was not the case, since the exploitation efforts in SLOW 
lead to the same high levels as observed in RESTART. However, the subjects in SLOW (just 
as in FAST) shared our expectation, hoping that their peers will reduce exploitation. This is 
the  expectation  to  action  discrepancy  that  defines  free-riding  intentions.  Wide-spread 
optimism  is  a  natural  consequence  when  –  as  in  the  SLOW  treatment  –  a  majority  of 
individuals exhibits this type of intentional free-riding behavior.  
   23
Figure 6 – Distribution of subject types 
 
9. Summary and Conclusion 
With this experiment we set out to test the hypothesis that the overexploitation of common 
pool resources may be lower than predicted by earlier experimental studies, because most of 
these experiments employ models in which the concern for future generations is screened out. 
Altruistic  concern  for  future  generations,  however,  may  provide  substantial  incentives  to 
constrain  the  exploitation  of  resources,  because  of  leverage  effect  of  the  resource  growth 
dynamics.  The  effects  of  any  altruistic  deviation  from  the  sustainable  extraction  path  are 
multiplied over innumerable future generations, turning a small sacrifice into a huge gift. In 
fact, a growing number of surveys provide evidence for a broad popular concern for the well-
being of future generations. Especially, the approval ratings for concepts of intergenerational 
equity  (such  as  the  concept  of  “sustainable  development”)  have  been  on  the  rise  (e.g. 
Kuckartz  and  Grunenberg  2002).  Given  the  theoretical  consideration  and  the  empirical 
evidence, our initial conjecture that adding an intergenerational link to a standard common 
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RESTART Distribution of Subject Types
OG: optimistic & intended gift-giving
RG: realistic & intended gift-giving
PG: pessimistic & intended gift-giving
OC: optimistic & intended consensus
RC: realistic & intended consensus
PC: pessimistic & intended consensus
OF: optimistic & intended free-riding
RF : realistic & intended free-riding
PF : pessimistic & intended free-riding  24
Unfortunately, however, our experimental results prove the hypothesis to be too optimistic. 
We do find clear and strong evidence that the presence of an intergenerational link affects 
subjects’ expectations concerning the behavior of their peers. But, while expecting their peers 
to face up to the intergenerational responsibility, subjects do not reduce their own exploitation 
levels in the presence of an intergenerational link. Since considerable restraint in resource 
extraction is expected, yet only moderate restraint is practiced, the resource stock diminishes 
in a social climate of unjustified optimism.  
Our subjects predict – just as we originally had – that intergenerational concern genuinely 
entails  some  potential  for  constraining  resource  extraction.  Entertaining  such  beliefs  in  a 
common  pool  resource  dilemma  means  that  the  expected  opportunity  cost  of  restraint 
increases,  because  the  strategies  in  the  game  are  substitutes,  i.e.  an  increase  of  the  own 
extraction is the best reply to others’ reduction of extraction. Hence, while altruistic motives 
in the intergenerational setting seem to make restraint in extraction more attractive, financial 
incentives (matched with the wrong beliefs concerning the others) seem to support increased 
extraction. Notably, this financial incentive seems to offset the altruistic motive for most of 
the subjects in our main experimental treatment with slow growth, in which extraction levels 
are not lower than in the control treatment without an intergenerational link. The balance is 
opposite in our fast growth control treatment, in which the extraction levels are lower than in 
the main treatment, but the predictions of others’ behavior is similar. Taken together these 
results show an especially high frequency of optimistic, but free-riding subjects in our main 
treatment. It seems clear that the intergenerational link, which we had hoped would mitigate 
the commons problem, does not help at all. In a way, it even worsens the situation compared 
to the case without an intergenerational link, by driving a wedge between beliefs and actions 
of the appropriators. 
Our results have some strong negative implications for policies relying on self-governance of 
intergenerational common pools. The problem is severe, because none of the instruments that 
have been found to mitigate the overexploitation problem in intragenerational settings are 
readily available in intergenerational CPR management. Two-way pre-play communication, 
for example, that has been found to be a very effective means of enhancing efficiency in 
single-generation common pool resource extraction, is not available across generations. The 
same holds for the post-play punishment and repeated interaction. The actions we take today 
are  faît  à  complis  for  the  unborn  generations  of  tomorrow,  which  have  no  means  of 
communicating  with  us  or  administering  a  (repeated)  penalty  on  us.  Furthermore,  our   25
experimental  results  indicate  that  the  broad  popular  support  of  intergenerational  equity 
notions that are commonly found in polls are more likely to reflect the well-known support-a-
good-cause-as-long-as-others-pay-the-bill  attitude  than  a  strong  commitment  to  sacrifice 
substantial amounts of current consumption. 
Even though our results seem very negative with respect to the intergenerational concern, we 
do see some light at the horizon. First, we find that subjects genuinely care about others, 
because the average extraction level is well-below the equilibrium levels in all treatments. 
Second, we observe that the intergenerational responsibility is actually recognized, even if 
subjects  in  our  main  treatment,  obviously  are  hoping  that  others  will  face  up  to  this 
responsibility. In our view, policies that make use of these two phenomenon can succeed in 
creating  a  favorable  setting  for  sustainability.  For  example,  environmental  policy  may  be 
more successful, if the popular mood of the electorate is used to establish constitutional rights 
for future generations, before dealing with specific cases. This can have the advantage that 
voters, who – as in our experiment – may not willing to show enough restraint when their 
income is immediately affected, may – as the survey data indicates – nevertheless vote for a 
general rule. Such constitutional rights can then be used to emulate those mechanisms across 
generations that have proven valuable within a generation. They can, for example, implement 
a punishment possibility that allows sanctioning appropriators today if their behavior harms 
the  interests of future generations. Finally, if voluntary restraint is required, it seems that 
providing information on the actual extraction levels may at least help avoid the extreme 
optimism that we observe. 
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Appendix 1 – Instructions 
[The original instructions were in German. They are available upon request from the authors.] 
Welcome to this experiment! Next to you, there are a number of other persons participating in this 
experiment. All participants are matched in groups of three. A number of these groups form a chain. A 
chain consists of a first, a last and an undisclosed number of intermediate groups. No participant is 
informed on the position of the own group within the chain. 
An  endowment  is  made  available  to  the  first  group  in  the  chain.  Every  other  group  receives  the 
endowment that the preceding group in the chain has left over. Thus, the endowment is passed from 
one group to the next and develops according to the decisions in the chain. The payoff potential of a 
group  depends  on  the  endowment  left  to  it.  Apart  from  possible  differences  in  endowment,  the 
decision situation is identical for all participants in a chain.  
The other two members of your group are simultaneously at other experiment locations on campus. 
The group preceding our group has already participated in the experiment. The succeeding groups will 
participate after you. The participants, who are currently at your experiment location are associated to 
other chains. Thus, you see no other member of your chain: neither from a preceding, nor from the 
current, nor from a succeeding group. 
Decisions and payoffs in different chains are completely independent from each other. 
The task of each participant is to choose one of the numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8. 
The decisions in a group jointly affect the payoffs of the group members. The table printed on the 
decision sheet shows these effects on payoffs. All participants in your chain receive exactly the same 
table, but not necessarily the same endowment as you do. However, all three members of a specific 
group – also of your group – have the same endowment.  
Every  white  cell  in  the  table  displays  the  possible  payoff  that  you  will  receive,  if  you  select  the 
number in the corresponding row and the sum of the numbers chosen by the other two members of 
your group is the number of the corresponding column.  
Please, note that the possible payoffs are given in percent of the current endowment. This means, 
that after every member of your group has made a decision, your payoff in “Taler” is determined as 
follows: if the respective entry in the table is x, then you receive x% of the current endowment. 
The sum of the decisions in a group affects the endowment left for the succeeding group in the chain. 
The numbers in the gray cells of the table determine the way in which the endowment for the next 
group changes.  
If the cell that is determined by the decisions contains “+/-0,” then the endowment does not change. 
If a number y is indicated there, together with a “+”, then the endowment is increased by y% for the 
succeeding  group.  If  a  number  y  is  indicated  there,  together  with  a  “-”,  then  the  endowment  is 
decreased by y% for the succeeding group. The new endowment is calculated in this way and left for 
the succeeding group in the chain. The members of that group face the same decision situation as 
you do, except for the possibly changed endowment.  
Furthermore, it is your task to mark your guess concerning the sum of the decisions of the 
other two members of your group. 
The closer your prediction is to the actual decisions of the two other participants, the higher the bonus 
that you additionally receive. If your prediction exactly matches the actual decisions, you receive 20 
Taler. If your prediction does not perfectly match the actual decisions, your bonus will be reduced by 
as many Talers as your prediction deviates from actual decisions. 
After  all  members  of  your  group  have  made  their  decisions,  your  payoff  and  your  bonus  will  be 
calculated and paid to you in cash, using an exchange rate of DM 0,05 per Taler. 
If you still have questions, please refer to one of our assistants. 
We wish you success!   29
Appendix 2 – Decision Sheets 
 Sheet 1) FAST treatment 
  
Sheet 2) SLOW treatment 
location (current stock G)
0
Please, tick the box indicating your prediction of the sum of choices by the other participants.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
please tick here [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
% of G
Please, choose one of the eight possibilities here. equals
my decision the sum of the chocies made by the other participants in your group of three
Taler
please tick below 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 plus
1 [ ] 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 51 44 38 32 28 24 21 18 20
+75 +71 +67 +63 +58 +54 +50 +46 +42 +38 +33 +29 +25 +21 +17 minus
2 [ ] 120 120 120 120 120 120 102 87 75 65 56 48 41 35 30
+71 +67 +63 +58 +54 +50 +46 +42 +38 +33 +29 +25 +21 +17 +13
3 [ ] 180 180 180 180 180 153 131 113 97 84 72 62 53 45 38 (prediction deviation)
+67 +63 +58 +54 +50 +46 +42 +38 +33 +29 +25 +21 +17 +13 +8 equals
4 [ ] 240 240 240 240 204 175 150 129 111 96 83 71 60 51 42
my payoff in %  +63 +58 +54 +50 +46 +42 +38 +33 +29 +25 +21 +17 +13 +8 +4 Taler
of the current G 5 [ ] 300 300 300 255 218 188 162 139 120 103 88 75 64 53 43 times
x +58 +54 +50 +46 +42 +38 +33 +29 +25 +21 +17 +13 +8 +4 +0 0.05 DM
y 6 [ ] 360 360 306 262 225 194 167 144 124 106 90 76 63 51 41 equals
change of the +54 +50 +46 +42 +38 +33 +29 +25 +21 +17 +13 +8 +4 +0 +4
stock for 7 [ ] 420 357 305 263 226 195 168 145 123 105 88 74 60 48 37 DM
the next group +50 +46 +42 +38 +33 +29 +25 +21 +17 +13 +8 +4 +0 +4 +8 personal
of three in % 8 [ ] 408 349 300 258 223 192 165 141 120 101 84 68.6 54.5 41.7 30 payoff
of the current G +46 +42 +38 +33 +29 +25 +21 +17 +13 +8 +4 +0 +4 +8 +13
You are welcome to write any comments here:
location (current stock G)
0
Please, tick the box indicating your prediction of the sum of choices by the other participants.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
please tick here [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
% of G
Please, choose one of the eight possibilities here. equals
my decision the sum of the chocies made by the other participants in your group of three
Taler
please tick below 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 plus
1 [ ] 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 51 44 38 32 28 24 21 18 20
+13 +8 +4 +0 -4 -8 -13 -17 -21 -25 -29 -33 -38 -42 -46 minus
2 [ ] 120 120 120 120 120 120 102 87 75 65 56 48 41 35 30
+8 +4 +0 -4 -8 -13 -17 -21 -25 -29 -33 -38 -42 -46 -50
3 [ ] 180 180 180 180 180 153 131 113 97 84 72 62 53 45 38 (prediction deviation)
+4 +0 -4 -8 -13 -17 -21 -25 -29 -33 -38 -42 -46 -50 -54 equals
4 [ ] 240 240 240 240 204 175 150 129 111 96 83 71 60 51 42
my payoff in %  +0 -4 -8 -13 -17 -21 -25 -29 -33 -38 -42 -46 -50 -54 -58 Taler
of the current G 5 [ ] 300 300 300 255 218 188 162 139 120 103 88 75 64 53 43 times
x -4 -8 -13 -17 -21 -25 -29 -33 -38 -42 -46 -50 -54 -58 -63 0.05 DM
y 6 [ ] 360 360 306 262 225 194 167 144 124 106 90 76 63 51 41 equals
change of the -8 -13 -17 -21 -25 -29 -33 -38 -42 -46 -50 -54 -58 -63 -67
stock for 7 [ ] 420 357 305 263 226 195 168 145 123 105 88 74 60 48 37 DM
the next group -13 -17 -21 -25 -29 -33 -38 -42 -46 -50 -54 -58 -63 -67 -71 personal
of three in % 8 [ ] 408 349 300 258 223 192 165 141 120 101 84 68.6 54.5 41.7 30 payoff
of the current G -17 -21 -25 -29 -33 -38 -42 -46 -50 -54 -58 -63 -67 -71 -75
You are welcome to write any comments here:  30
Sheet 3) RESTART treatment 
 
Appendix 3 – Data 
Table A2.1 – Data treatment FAST 




ration  Decision  Pre-
diction 
Best 
Reply  Decision  Pre-
diction 
Best 







1  1  8  6  7  3  6  7  4  7  7  9.15 
1  2  3  6  7  7  11  6  5  10  6  11.44 
1  3  1  2  7  6  6  7  5  9  7  14.30 
1  4  2  6  7  4  8  7  4  8  7  19.73 
2  1  5  8  7  4  8  7  3  8  7  9.15 
2  2  4  7  7  7  9  7  6  7  7  12.63 
2  3  5  11  6  1  16  5  5  11  6  14.77 
2  4  6  4  6  6  9  7  4  9  7  20.98 
3  1  6  12  6  3  6  7  4  7  7  9.15 
3  2  2  6  7  4  8  7  4  9  7  12.17 
3  3  5  8  7  4  7  7  5  7  7  17.77 
3  4  5  10  6  5  9  7  6  9  7  22.92 
4  1  6  11  6  3  6  7  6  11  6  9.15 
4  2  3  6  7  6  4  6  3  6  7  11.44 
4  3  5  10  6  3  6  7  3  6  7  15.78 
4  4  3  6  7  4  9  7  4  12  6  22.41 
 
location (current stock G)
0
Please, tick the box indicating your prediction of the sum of choices by the other participants.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
please tick here [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ]
% of G
Please, choose one of the eight possibilities here. equals
my decision the sum of the chocies made by the other participants in your group of three
Taler
please tick below 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 plus
1 [ ] 60 60 60 60 60 60 60 51 44 38 32 28 24 21 18 20
+0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 minus
2 [ ] 120 120 120 120 120 120 102 87 75 65 56 48 41 35 30
+0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0
3 [ ] 180 180 180 180 180 153 131 113 97 84 72 62 53 45 38 (prediction deviation)
+0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 equals
4 [ ] 240 240 240 240 204 175 150 129 111 96 83 71 60 51 42
my payoff in %  +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 Taler
of the current G 5 [ ] 300 300 300 255 218 188 162 139 120 103 88 75 64 53 43 times
x +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 0.05 DM
y 6 [ ] 360 360 306 262 225 194 167 144 124 106 90 76 63 51 41 equals
change of the +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0
stock for 7 [ ] 420 357 305 263 226 195 168 145 123 105 88 74 60 48 37 DM
the next group +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 personal
of three in % 8 [ ] 408 349 300 258 223 192 165 141 120 101 84 68.6 54.5 41.7 30 payoff
of the current G +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0 +0
You are welcome to write any comments here:  31
Table A2.2 – Data treatment SLOW 




ration  Decision  Pre-
diction 
Best 
Reply  Decision  Pre-
diction 
Best 







1  1  6  10  6  6  9  7  8  14  5  9.15 
1  2  7  13  6  5  10  6  6  10  6  3.84 
1  3  7  10  6  5  7  7  4  10  6  1.92 
1  4  3  6  7  3  6  7  3  6  7  1.11 
2  1  3  11  6  6  11  6  5  11  6  9.15 
2  2  4  3  6  6  8  7  7  5  7  6.13 
2  3  5  8  7  5  14  5  6  12  6  3.31 
2  4  2  6  7  4  2  7  6  11  6  1.92 
3  1  6  12  6  6  11  6  6  9  7  9.15 
3  2  6  3  6  4  8  7  7  2  7  4.58 
3  3  5  10  6  6  10  6  5  13  6  2.47 
3  4  6  10  6  8  16  5  7  9  7  1.43 
4  1  3  6  7  5  9  7  5  8  7  9.15 
4  2  8  3  6  7  11  6  5  9  7  6.50 
4  3  5  9  7  7  2  7  3  7  7  2.73 
4  4  6  7  7  5  9  7  7  2  7  1.72 
 
 
Table A2.3 – Data treatment RESTART  




ration  Decision  Pre-
diction 
Best 
Reply  Decision  Pre-
diction 
Best 







1  1  4  13  6  7  14  5  5  11  6  9.15 
1  2  7  14  5  4  9  7  5  10  6  9.15 
1  3  5  10  6  6  9  7  4  10  6  9.15 
1  4  5  11  6  7  14  5  4  7  7  9.15 
2  1  5  14  5  6  12  6  5  8  7  9.15 
2  2  5  9  7  4  8  7  5  10  6  9.15 
2  3  7  2  7  5  9  7  5  10  6  9.15 
2  4  3  8  7  5  14  5  4  10  6  9.15 
3  1  3  6  7  7  10  6  6  6  7  9.15 
3  2  6  9  7  6  11  6  4  11  6  9.15 
3  3  5  14  5  5  10  6  6  11  6  9.15 
3  4  5  8  7  5  8  7  5  8  7  9.15 
4  1  5  8  7  7  10  6  7  8  7  9.15 
4  2  6  11  6  5  9  7  6  10  6  9.15 
4  3  4  8  7  5  9  7  7  13  6  9.15 
4  4  6  12  6  6  8  7  4  8  7  9.15 
 